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The UN Security Coundl 
Ineffective but Dndispensable 
"The UN perfectly embodies in 
institutional form the tragic paradox of our 
age; it has become indispensable before it 
has become effective" .1 Thus wrote 
Herbert Nicholas in 1962, a time when the 
organisation was deeply embroiled in an 
African civil war and was widely thought 
to be on the verge of collapse. Some forty 
years later the papers are again filled with 
doom-laden predictions, if not of the UN's 
imminent demise, then at least of its 
permanent marginalisation in the field of 
international peace and security. This time, 
the gloom has been occasioned by the 
profound divisions that emerged among the 
Permanent Five (P 5) members of the 
Security Council over how best to deal 
with Iraq's failure to abide by a long line of 
mandatory resolutions requiring that it 
comes clean about the true stare of its 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programme. The failure to overcome 
Council divisions, followed by the US-led 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003 without 
explicit Security Council authorisation for 
the use of force, added further to the sense 
of foreboding among those anxious for the 
Council to play its Charter-prescribed role 
in the field of peace and security. In the 
run-up to the war, neither key Council 
members nor senior UN officials did much 
to discourage the notion that the crisis over 
Iraq was indeed presenting the Council 
with its "moment of truth". As Secretary of 
State Colin Powell told fellow Council 
members on 5 February, the Council was 
placing "itself in danger of irrelevance" if 
it allowed "Iraq to continue to defy its will 
without responding effectively and 
immediately" .2 Nor did the outbreak and 
aftermath of hostilities result in any 
immediate attempt to sooth tensions and 
repair relations, even though many had 
hoped this could have been achieved by 
reaching agreement on a central role for 
the UN in rebuilding and administrating 
Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein's 
odious regime.3 
And yet, for all this, the post-Cold War 
history of Security Council and, more 
broadly, that of the ON's involvement in 
the field of peace and security, point to the 
continuing validity of Herbert Nicholas' 
original observation: the UN remains both 
indispensable and, in certain unavoidable 
respects, ineffective. Against the backdrop 
of the long-drawn out crisis over Iraq and 
focusing in particular on the Security 
Council and its permanent five veto-
wielding members - Britain, France, China, 
Russia and the United States- this study 
explores the paradox of indispensability 
and ineffectiveness in greater detail. 
Argument in Brief 
By the standards of the post-Cold War 
period, the amount of bad blood and ill 
feeling generated by the Council divisions 
and intramural politics over Iraq -
especially in the last three months or so 
leading up to the war - has been 
unprecedented. As the continuing tensions, 
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above all between France and US, make 
clear, this is bound to affect the workings 
of the Council in the short to medium 
term. The proposition, however, that the 
Council has just failed its "ultimate test of 
relevance" and that, by implication, the 
UN is now irreparably damaged, is far 
less obvious. Indeed, there are good 
reasons for believing that the 
disagreements over Iraq have been more 
damaging in the long run to NATO and to 
the aspirations for a Common European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) than 
they have to the UN. Whether or not this 
turns out to be the case is rightly seen by 
many as hinging on the future attitude of 
the United States to the UN. Even here, 
the outlook is less gloomy than it might 
appear in the immediate aftermath of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, especially if a 
longer-term perspective is adopted. To see 
why this is so, this study will seek to 
answer three, partly overlapping, sets of 
questions: 
• 
• 
• 
Why, in spite of the Security 
Council's highly uneven record of 
performance in the 1990s, have its 
PS members continued to see an 
important role for it in the field of 
international peace and security? 
What light does the Council's 
handling of the crisis over Iraq 
throw on its and, more broadly, 
the UN's role in the field of 
international peace and security? 
What is likely to be the long-term 
impact of the breakdown of 
consensus over Iraq for the 
Security Council and, again more 
broadly, for the UN's role in the 
field of international peace and 
security? 
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To place these questions in a meaningful 
context, however, it is necessary to revisit, 
briefly, Nicholas' paradox. Two related 
considerations help explain the paradox. 
Unravelling the Paradox 
The first of these relates to the question of 
what precisely is meant by the UN's 
"effectiveness" or lack thereof in the field 
of international security. The great illusion 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s was that 
the end of the Cold War would 
automatically translate into an "effective" 
UN. It was an illusion that rested crucially 
on the belief that the Security Council, 
after years of paralysis, would "finally" be 
allowed to assume its "primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security". It was 
almost as if the removal of East-West 
ideological divisions would itself ensure 
that Council members would always see 
eye to eye on issues of peace and security 
and, moreover, be prepared to act jointly in 
defence of common interests. To state that 
this was always a vain and misplaced hope 
is not to imply that the passing of the Cold 
War did not have profound consequences 
for the UN. But as the Council's recent 
handling of the Iraq inspections crisis made 
abundantly clear, power politics - within 
and outside the organisation -is alive and 
well, and the entirely predictable 
persistence of conflicts of interest and 
value among member states means that the 
Council is, at one level, inescapably 
doomed to "ineffectiveness". This is true, 
above all, when the core or vital interests 
of states are seen to be at stake and when, 
as in the case of Iraq, issues of coercion are 
involved. However, assessing effectiveness 
in relation to an unattainable ideal and a 
misplaced notion of what "might have 
been" tells us very little about the Council's 
continuing and evident utility to states. Nor 
does it help us to understand how the UN 
as an organisation has evolved and 
adapted, in many cases innovatively, to the 
changing circumstances of the post-Cold 
War world. This brings us to the second 
consideration. 
In addition to its formal role, the Security 
Council has long performed a number of 
other unacknowledged functions. Three of 
these merit special mention. First, the UN 
and its associated organs and agencies can 
always be relied upon to act as a 
"scapegoat for the vanities and follies of 
statesmen" and, especially for its PS 
members, they have done so on many more 
than one occasion.4 As Conor Cruise 
O'Brien has regularly reminded us, this 
function is in fact "one of the things the 
UN is about, and is a large part of utility to 
national leaders" .5 A second and vital 
political function of the Council has been to 
serve as an instrument for collective 
legitimisation of state action, that is, as a 
"dispenser of politically significant 
approval and disapproval of the claims, 
policies, and actions of states".' A third 
and related cluster of functions has been to 
provide P 5 states with a mechanism 
through which their separate and 
distinctive interests can sometimes be more 
effectively advanced, concessions or quid 
pro quos from other member states 
secured, and likely international criticism 
of what are in effect unilateral policies or 
actions deflected. Post-Cold War examples 
illustrating each of these functions include: 
China's repeated use of its Council 
members to signal and restate its interests 
vis-a-vis Taiwan;7 Russia's apparently 
successful effort in 1994 to obtain a "more 
forthcoming US position on Georgia and 
Tajikistan" in exchange for supporting a 
US-sponsored resolution on Haiti;' and 
France's ability to deflect criticism of its 
policies in Rwanda before and during the 
genocide by receiving Security Council 
endorsement of Operation Turquoise, its 
military-humanitarian and, it should be 
added, morally ambiguous operation in the 
country from June to August 1994.9 
Once these considerations are borne in 
mind - to wit the persistence of power 
politics inside and outside the organisation 
and, intimately related to this, the 
importance of the Council's 
unacknowledged functions - it becomes 
much easier to understand why repeated 
"crises of credibility" facing the Council in 
the 1990s did not fatally undermine its 
perceived utility to states. The paralysing 
tensions over Bosnia in 1994-95, the 
shameful inaction over R wanda in 1994 
and the insurmountable divisions that 
emerged over Kosovo in 1999; to observers 
at the time these were all seen to be just as 
life-threatening as the impasse over Iraq 
appeared to many pundits in early 2003. 
An underlying question informing the 
present study is whether the deep divisions 
exposed over Iraq in 2002-03 have ushered 
in an altogether different and more serious 
crisis for the Council and for the UN's role 
in peace and security than those that 
occurred in the 1990s. 
The Uses and Utility of the Security 
Council to its Five Permanent Members 
Throughout the post-Cold War period, the 
general presumption that matters of 
international peace and security ought, if 
at all possible, to be referred to the 
Security Council has proved resilient. In 
particular, all five permanent members, 
though for different reasons, have retained 
a strong interest in ensuring that the 
Council does not become marginalised, 
notwithstanding its many real and 
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apparent failures. The Council is quite 
simply the only forum of its kind; that is, a 
forum able to address, if not resolve, 
security challenges of international concern 
and, crucially, to confer near-universal 
legitimacy on the actions of states or 
groups of states in a way that no 
alternative candidate or agency, real or 
proposed, has been able to do. It is, in this 
context, striking though telling just how 
problematic and, on the whole, 
unsuccessful have been the attempts -
explicitly called for in the Agenda for 
Peace in 1992- to breath life into Charter 
provisions encouraging "regional 
arrangements and agencies" to deal with 
issues of peace and security.10 The evident 
difficulties of doing so - as the experience 
of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia in the 
1990s suggests - have stemmed not from 
questionable legality (after all ECOWAS 
action was authorised by the Security 
Council) but rather from ECOWAS' 
perceived lack of legitimacy. The intense 
diplomatic effort by Britain and the US to 
secure an explicit authorisation for the use 
of force in early 2003, however 
unsuccessful and flawed the diplomacy, is 
itself testimony to the importance attached 
to the Council's legitimising role. Not only 
that, but both the US and the UK, in 
justifying the resort to force and explaining 
the need for military action, have 
continued to rely heavily on UN Security 
Council resolutions, a fact that only 
reinforces the sense that neither country 
felt they could dispense with some kind of 
UN sanction for its chosen course of 
action. 11 This esteem in which the Council 
continues to be held derives in large part 
from its custodial role as protector of 
principles and rules seen by the vast 
majority of member states still as 
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foundational to international order: above 
all, the principle of sovereign equality of 
states and its corollary the rule of non-
intervention by states in the affairs of other 
states. To the extent that military action in 
Iraq has been viewed, in many parts of the 
world, as a challenge to these principles, 
one may expect to see a renewed 
commitment to the UN by the membership 
at large." This, in turn is unlikely to 
diminish the need for major powers to 
work through the UN in order to secure 
legitimacy for its actions. 
More positively, however, and as 
indicated above, the PS members also have 
their own compelling reasons for ensuring 
that the Council's role, status and authority 
in international affairs are not irreparably 
weakened. In setting out and explaining 
their policies or courses of action, member 
states do of course invariably emphasise 
the degree to which these conform to the 
principles and intentions of the Charter. 
The near-ritualistic character of the 
language used on such occasions is an 
important part of what gives the UN its 
quality of theatre and "sacred drama", 
qualities that were much in evidence in the 
run-up to war. 13 While principles clearly do 
play a role and should not be dismissed 
outright, the post-Cold War history of the 
UN also points to other powerful reasons 
why all of the P 5 members - though, 
especially, Britain, France and Russia - are 
likely to remain committed to using the 
Security Council. 
The United Kingdom and France 
The commitment of the United Kingdom 
and France to keeping the Security Council 
at the centre of considerations relating to 
international peace and security is the 
easiest to explain. The fact is that their 
permanent position on the Council with a 
right of veto reflects the realities of a 
different era (and some would say even 
that is questionable), and it gives them a 
prominence out of proportion to their 
actual ability to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and 
security. "Warrior nations" and original 
members of the nuclear club they may well 
be, but their actual power projection 
capabilities are limited and easily, as the 
latter half of the 1990s showed, 
overstretched. If other indices are used -
such as economic might or size of 
population - their claim to privileged status 
is even more tenuous. These are the 
reasons why The Economist, with 
characteristic bluntness, stated that both 
countries "know their membership is the 
main reason anyone takes them at all 
seriously on the world stage" .14 This, of 
course, is not entirely fair, partly because 
both countries have sought to compensate 
for their weakness by often assuming 
leadership on key issues and by making a 
disproportionate contribution to UN 
activities in the security field. The effort to 
"compensate" is also reflected in the 
consistently high quality of its 
representatives in New York and the high 
level of activism they display (often in 
marked contrast to those countries whose 
Great Power, or indeed Superpower, 
credentials are uncontested). Still, the 
statement does contain a large element of 
truth and explains why both countries are 
anxious to preserve the primacy of the 
Council. It often also helps explain their 
behaviour on the international scene. For 
example, when, in 1992, Prime Minister 
John Major and his Foreign Minister 
Douglas Hurd, persuaded a reluctant 
Cabinet and a sceptical UK Chiefs of Staff 
about the need for Britain to deploy 
military forces in Bosnia, a key argument 
was that the UK, as permanent member of 
the Council, could ill afford to remain 
passive, especially at a time when there 
was much talk about the "legitimacy" of 
the Council's composition. 
Although central to both countries, the 
status conferred by Council membership 
appears, at times, even more important to 
France. When pressed, British officials 
might just about accept the reality of being 
a "middle-range power" albeit one which 
"can punch above its weight". Not so for 
France, which remains deeply wedded to 
the belief that it has a unique and a 
distinctive role to play in international 
affairs. Whether it is played out within 
Europe, in Africa or, as over Iraq, in its 
self-identification as the focus of resistance 
to US assertions of hegemony, France 
instinctively behaves and sees itself as a 
"Great Power", with the duties and 
prerogatives that go with it. The 
psychology of this was clearly manifested 
by style and manner of France's public 
diplomacy during the Iraq crisis. Council 
membership is a critical factor enabling 
France to assert its role, and France's 
insistence that the UN should play a 
"central role" in post-War Iraq was 
therefore entirely to be expected. 
In short, France and Britain will continue 
to stress the indispensability of the UN and 
the Security Council in international 
affairs, as indeed has nearly every official 
statement made by the two governments 
since the end of the war. France, in 
particular, has been adamant on this score 
with President Chirac making clear his 
position that "it is up to the United Nations 
- and it alone - to take on the political, 
economic, humanitarian and administrative 
reconstruction of Iraq" .ts 
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Russia and China 
Like Britain and France, Russia recognises 
that permanent membership of the Council 
has become an essential element in its 
claim to Great Power status. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the loss 
of superpower status and Empire were, 
although peaceful, deeply traumatic for the 
Russian foreign policy elite and induced 
within it a strong concern about Russia's 
international standing alongside other 
Council members. The influence on policy 
resulting from this consciousness of 
unaccustomed weakness was particularly 
striking during the tenure of President 
Yeltsin. With respect to the war in Bosnia 
in 1992-95, for example, Moscow's actions 
and initiatives were primarily driven, as 
Christina von Siemens has persuasively 
shown, by a desire to enhance its prestige 
and demonstrate that "Russia was still an 
important player whose cooperation and 
input were necessary for the solution of 
international problems" .16 While the sense 
of weakness is less acute today, the desire 
to prove that Russia is "the diplomatic 
successor to the USSR not just in name but 
also in might and importance" persists and 
provides a vital backdrop to Moscow's 
solemn and oft-stared commitment to the 
UN and the Security Council.' 7 As 
indicated above, PS membership has also 
enabled Russia to elicit concessions from 
other major powers, notably the US, as the 
aforementioned case of Haiti in 1994 
shows. Against this, it is hardly surprising 
that Foreign Minister lvanov and President 
Putin, like Chirac, have unequivocally and 
repeatedly stressed the need for the UN to 
assume an early and central role in post-
war Iraq, including the task of "political 
reconstruction" and a continuing role for 
UNMOVIC. 18 
China is far more relaxed about its Great 
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Power status: it has never doubted that it is 
one. Still, it has always found its Security 
Council membership a crucial instrument 
through which it can make clear what it is 
against: basically anything that can be 
construed as undermining the principle of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
member states and, even more importantly 
to the communist party leadership, 
anything that can be seen as lending 
support for Taiwan's claim to full 
independence. China's voting behaviour in 
the Security Council is easily explained in 
terms of these two objectives. Through a 
series of abstentions in the 1990s, China 
registered its disquiet with the UN's 
growing involvement in the internal affairs 
of member states and, in particular, with 
what appeared to be an increased 
readiness to invoke Chapter VII in respect 
of humanitarian emergencies and 
"massive" human rights violations. 19 
Vetoes have been used much more 
sparingly to punish anyone dealing with 
Taiwan. 
Throughout the crisis over Iraq, China's 
overriding priority has been to avoid long-
term damage to its relations with the US 
and far less concern has been exhibited 
about the possible damage of the crisis for 
the UN. As Chesterman and Einsiedel 
observed, throughout the process of 
negotiating 1441, China "stayed at the 
sidelines ... " making it clear that "it would 
not stand in the way of a tough UN 
resolution against Iraq" .20 Since the end of 
the war, it has also been much less insistent 
on the need for the UN's early return, 
confining itself- predictably in light of the 
above - to stressing the importance of 
preserving Iraq's territorial integrity. 
The United States 
On the face of it, the value and the utility 
of the Security Council is much less 
obvious to the US than it is to its veto-
wielding colleagues on the Council. Set 
against the resources and capabilities of 
fellow Council members (let alone the 
UN membership at large), the 
overwhelming nature of America's 
military, economic and political might 
has long encouraged a constituency 
within the US to argue that it simply 
"does not need the UN". At best, so the 
argument runs, the Council can endorse 
US actions; more likely, it will only 
complicate and shackle its exercise of 
leadership in the international system. 
And yet, the US has repeatedly been 
drawn back to the UN, finding that the 
legitimacy it confers on its actions, if not 
indispensable to taking action, is 
extremely costly to ignore. The very 
decision by President Bush to confront 
the issue of Iraq's non-compliance 
through the UN is testimony to this fact, 
even though reaching that decision 
required all the persuasive powers of his 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable and hardly 
surprising that the attitudes to the UN, 
historically as well as in the "post-9/11 
world", are more ambiguous and 
complex than those of the other four 
permanent members. The question it 
raises is whether the experience of 
"going down the UN route" in relation to 
Iraq has permanently damaged US-UN 
relations and tipped the balance in favour 
of those always inclined to avoid that 
route. 
UN Security Council and the Crisis over 
Iraq 
The Security Council and Iraq, 1991-2001 
Iraq's invasion and wholesale annexation 
of Kuwait in early August 1990 
represented an unusually clear-cut 
violation of fundamental Charter 
principles; a fact which greatly eased the 
task of securing Security Council 
authorisation for military action to reverse 
Iraqi aggression. Such authorisation was 
provided by the now famous wording of 
Resolution 678 adopted on 29 November 
1990 and calling on member states co-
operating with Kuwait to "use all 
necessary means to uphold and implement 
Resolution 660 and all subsequent 
resolutions and to restore international 
peace and security in the area" .21 Before 
that, Council members had also agreed on 
other measures, most notably the 
imposition of comprehensive economic 
sanctions against Iraq, a decision taken 
four days after the invasion with only two 
abstentions (Cuba and Yemen).22 Great 
power unity persisted into the post-
hostilities phase with the so-called ceasefire 
resolution, UNSC 687, demanding of Iraq 
that it eliminate its weapons of mass 
destruction and, to this end, authorising the 
creation of a UN Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) to ensure compliance with 
non-nuclear (that is, chemical and 
biological) disarmament provisions and to 
assist the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (!AEA) in the nuclear area.23 It 
was against this backdrop of 
unaccustomed Council unity and sense of 
purpose- felt all the more keenly so soon 
after the end of the Cold War - that 
President George H. Bush saw fit to 
declare a "New World Order" in which the 
UN, no longer shackled by Cold War 
divisions, would play a central role in 
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international peace and security. 
The initial consensus on Iraq among the 
PS, however, was short-lived. Differences 
regarding the implementation of both the 
sanctions and the inspection regime soon 
emerged between the US and Britain on the 
one hand and France and Russia on the 
other, with China "somewhere in the 
middle" .24 As early as in 1994, Russia and 
France began to call for a "road map" to 
the lifting of sanctions and, in late 1998, 
the withdrawal of UNSCOM from Iraq 
followed by a US-UK military campaign 
(Operation Desert Fox) launched without 
explicit Security Council authorisation, 
marked the definitive break-up of the Gulf 
War alliance. The US and the UK 
continued to patrol the no-fly zones- set 
up without explicit Council authorisation in 
1991 and 1992- and the "oil for food" 
programme offered a messy compromise 
on the sanctions issue. 
Not surprisingly, the divisions among 
key Council members reflected an 
admixture of motives, principles and 
interest, not always easy to disentangle. 
Concerns about the wider humanitarian 
consequences of sanctions on the Iraqi 
people, frequently evoked by France as 
an argument for lifting or modifying the 
sanctions regime, overlapped with 
commercial and business interests, held 
also by Russia and China. As the 
consensus broke down, the Security 
Council -as in other instances where its 
key members have deemed their vital 
interests to be engaged - came to provide 
the forum through which competing 
interests could be managed and, to the 
extent possible, policies reconciled. The 
policy differences themselves, however, 
never disappeared. 
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Iraq, 11 September 2001 and the "Neo-
conservative" moment 
Briefing the Council on S February 2003, 
Colin Powel informed his colleagues that 
"leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of 
weapons of mass destruction for a few 
more months or years is not an option, not 
in a post-September 11 rh world." The last 
part of that statement provides the critical 
backdrop to understanding Council politics 
between September 2002 and March 2003 , 
and it gives to the diplomacy of those 
months, however incompetently executed, 
a certain inevitable trajectory. For the US, 
the "post-Cold War era" came to an end 
on 11 September 2001, ensuring in the 
process that Iraq would sooner rather than 
later re-emerge as a major source of 
tension among the PS. Not unlike the 
launch by of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 
October 19S7, the strategic significance of 
the terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington DC was to expose the 
vulnerability of the US continent to direct 
strategic attack. The analogy with Sputnik 
- a small satellite about the size of a 
football - is even more apt in terms of its 
psychological impact; a fact which many 
Europeans, used to the threat of terrorism 
and with a long and unenviable history of 
wars to show for, have yet to appreciate 
fully. Whether or not Iraq had links with 
terrorist groups and whatever the true 
state of its WMD programme, in Powell's 
"post-September 11th world" such 
considerations were close to immaterial 
since "the bulk of informed opinion 
coalesced not around probabilities, but 
consequences".25 This newfound sense of 
urgency and vulnerability to emerging 
threats permeating all US thinking on 
issues of international peace and security 
could not but inflame pre-existing divisions 
on the Council. 
But the revival of internecine Council 
politics and the diplomatic debacle in New 
York- and, indeed, the continuing 
uncertainty surrounding US-UN relations -
are also linked in a more indirect, though 
just as important, way to the events of 
September 11 and their aftermath. 
Specifically, they have raised the salience 
and influence of a group of officials, inside 
and outside the administration, now 
commonly, though not very edifyingly, 
referred to as ''neo~conservatives" or "nee-
cons" for short. Within the administration, 
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of 
Defence, is usually considered the most 
prominent among them, though the broad 
thrust of his position on the nature of the 
challenge facing US foreign and defence 
policy is shared by his immediate superior, 
Donald Rumsfeld, as well as with Vice 
President Dick Cheney. Closely associated 
with the group and seen by some as having 
furnished it with its philosophical or 
intellectual underpinnings, are Richard 
Perle, until recently head of the Defence 
Advisory Board, and William Kristol, 
editor of The Weekly Standard and 
chairman of "The Project for the New 
American Century". In reality, of course, 
the group is much less homogenous than 
many, especially critics in Europe, would 
make out. Moreover, the views espoused 
by those seen as belonging to the group are 
frequently caricatured, often hard to pin 
down on details, and not always 
convergent (the most striking bond 
between many of them appears to be an 
intense, almost visceral, antipathy to 
former President Clintoo and his 
administration). Nor, finally, is the precise 
impact of their ideas, though clearly in the 
ascendant since 9/11, on the President's 
own views and decisions entirely clear-cut 
or as easily traceable as is sometimes 
suggested. 
Nevertheless, and in the context of the 
present argument, neo-conservatives can 
fairly be said to share two broad views. 
The first of these is that the US has been 
"too timid in its exercise of global 
leadership" (a favourite phrase) and, seen 
as a corollary to this, insufficiently 
prepared to consider the use of military 
force in a "preventive" and "pre-emptive" 
capacity." Secondly, neo-cons are 
instinctively sceptical of multilateral 
institutions, including, perhaps above all, 
the UN. It is in the confluence and 
apparently growing influence of these 
views within the current US administration 
that the underlying and mostly unspoken 
tensions within the Council in the run up to 
the war, as well as the lingering unease felt 
by so many member states about the future 
of US attirudes to the UN, must be sought. 
With respect to the use of force, a 
growing unhappiness with the basic idea of 
deterrence was evident, not just in neo-
conservative circles, well before the events 
of 11 September 2001. The attacks on the 
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon did, 
however, immeasurably strengthen a 
generalised sentiment about the central 
inadequacy of deterrence as a means of 
countering the emerging threats of mass-
casualty terrorism and WMD proliferation. 
For neo-conservative thinkers in particular, 
the attacks underlined the arguments in 
favour of preventive and, when necessary 
and if possible, pre-emptive action. The US 
National Security Strategy (NSS) 
document of September 2002 - stating that 
the US "will not hesitate to act alone, if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self-
defense by acting pre-emptively" - was 
seen to reflect the influence of that view." 
That document in turn has come to be 
viewed as a more detailed expression of an 
IFS lnfo 4/03 13 
emerging "Bush Doctrine", the key 
elements of which William Kristol (in 
vague and no doubt alarming terms to 
outsiders) listed as "the focus on regime 
change, the focus on democracy 
promotion, possibly the pre-emption, in this 
new post-Cold War world, of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. " 28 On the Security Council, 
France, in particular, saw the US 
determination to face down Iraq as the first 
attempt to implement the policy of pre-
emption. And certainly for the neo-cons, 
finally confronting the issue of Iraq was 
always about "regime change", an aim 
which UN involvement was only likely to 
muddy or even endanger. 29 The US decision 
to take the matter to the UN with the 
President's speech to the General Assembly 
in September 2002 (and thereafter 
downplaying, at least in public, references 
to "regime change") was seen, not only by 
France, as a tactical victory for those 
administration officials like Colin Powell 
anxious to internationalise the issue and 
avoid isolation in the more than likely 
event of war.30 France's readiness to risk 
the opprobrium of the US by threatening to 
veto a follow-up resolution to UNSC 1441 
-until very late in the day it was assumed 
that France would back off- only shows 
the extent to which the issue at stake was 
not the role of the UN and the Security 
Council, or even Iraq, but about the uses of 
American power in the post-11 September 
world. 
The second issue on which neo-cons and 
others within the administration do appear 
to see eye-ro-eye is on the UN as "a 
dangerous place", to borrow the title of 
Daniel Moynihan's colourful reflections on 
his time as US Permanent Representative 
at the United Nations in New York. 31 
Moynihan, although deeply and rightly 
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disillusioned with what he saw of the UN 
in the 1970s, nevertheless appreciated that 
supporting and working through the 
organisation was not necessarily 
antithetical to US interests. The neo-
conservative view of the UN belongs to a 
different tradition. It is a long-standing, 
ideologically driven and intellectually 
undistinguished tradition on the right of 
American politics- from William 
Knowland, Senate Majority leader under 
President Eisenhower in the 1950s to Trent 
Lott, a much more recent Leader of the 
Senate - which views any association with 
the UN as carrying a very high risk (to put 
it as mildly as possible) of damaging and 
frustrating American interests and 
objectives in the international arena. While 
Knowland warned his countrymen about 
being "unequally yoked together with 
unbelievers", 32 Lott deplored the Clinton 
administration for having "sub-contracted" 
its foreign policy to the UN. It is an 
intellectually undistinguished tradition -
not because the UN as an institution does 
not deserve criticism; it quite clearly often 
does- but because it rests upon a radical 
failure to appreciate how, as a political 
institution, the UN actually works, what it 
can do and what it cannot do. It is a failure 
that is shared, of course, by a parallel 
tradition at the other end of the political 
spectrum; one that has chosen to treat the 
UN as a kind of embryonic world 
government-in-waiting, held back only by 
the outdated practices of power politics 
and "false consciousness" among its 
member states (that is, by their failure to 
recognise the "underlying harmony of real 
interests" among all states). As such the 
traditions feed on each other. In the present 
context, the point that needs making is that 
what may, simplistically, be called the 
Knowland-Lott tradition is vying for 
influence with a more pragmatic, 
ideologically neutral and more interest-
based approach to the UN, located 
principally within the State Department. 
That approach to the UN, as several 
observes have noted, corresponds more 
closely with that taken by the 
administration of George H. Bush (himself 
a permanent representative at the UN in 
the earlv 1970s) than it does with what is 
the dominant administration view in the 
immediate aftermath of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. 33 
While not directly related to the conflict 
and the tensions over Iraq, these 
considerations do have a very real bearing 
on the long-term consequences of the crisis 
for the UN and the Security Council. 
Assessing the Consequences of the Iraq 
Crisis for the Security Council and the UN 
The lingering effects of the crisis over Iraq 
and the acrimonious divisions it exposed in 
the Security Council should not be belittled. 
Certainly, in the short term, the tensions 
generated in the run-up to war are bound 
to impact on the workings of the Council 
and its handling of the many urgent issues 
on its agenda. This is true, above all, as far 
as relations between France and US are 
concerned (US relations with Russia and 
China appear, interestingly, to have 
emerged comparatively unscathed from the 
crisis).34 
It is also needs to be stressed that in one 
crucial respect the current crisis is of a 
different order than those with which the 
Council was confronted in the 1990s: its 
post-9/11 setting. It is the sense of urgency 
and vulnerability to emerging threats 
within US which, above all, has been 
driving the administration's policy over 
Iraq. While one may or may not share that 
sense of urgency (and clearly many 
Europeans do not), the continuing reality of 
its impact on US thinking and, by 
extension, on the value which the US is 
likely to place on the UN, cannot be 
denied. This fact, along with America's 
special dispensation as the sole superpower, 
suggests that any attempt to examine the 
impact of the crisis over Iraq for the UN 
requires a distinction to be drawn between 
the P4 (Britain, China, France and Russia) 
and the wider UN membership, on the one 
hand, and the US on the other. With respect 
to the former the grounds for optimism are 
considerable; with respect to the US they 
are clearly more uncertain but not perhaps 
as gloomy as widely reported. 
The P4 and the UN Membership at Large 
In considering the positions of Britain, 
France, China and Russia, it has already 
been observed that their traditionally 
strong support for "the principles of the 
Charter and the primacy of the Council" 
cannor easily be separated from more 
prosaic and hard-headed considerations of 
interest, prestige and honour. Indeed, with 
respect to all four countries, principle and 
calculations of interest reinforce each other 
and point to a continuing commitment to 
working through the organisation and, in 
particular, to using the Security Council as 
a means of promoting its interests in the 
world. Put more simply, all of them stand 
to lose from a weakening or 
marginalisation of the Council's role in 
international diplomacy. The crisis over 
Iraq, the war and its aftermath have only 
brought this reality home more clearly. It is 
worth noting, for example, that the 
Council's handling of Iraq between 
President Bush's speech to the General 
Assembly in September 2002 and the 
outbreak of war in March 2003 - though 
divisive, painful and bruising- also 
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revealed the extent to which the PS does 
indeed form an exclusive and privileged 
club, which Britain, France and Russia in 
particular would be loath to see 
undermined. In the negotiations over 
Resolution 1441, the non-permanent or 
elected members of the Council (the "E10") 
were, in effect, entirely excluded from 
detailed consultations over various drafts, 
to the point where some draft resolutions 
appeared in the New York Times before 
they were seen by the E10. This was in 
sharp contrast, of course, to the unseemly, 
though by historical standards neither 
unusual nor unexpected, scramble for votes 
in an effort to secure support for a second 
resolution. To one observer, that scramble 
was a "diplomatic opera of odd courtships, 
arm-twisting, compromises and back-room 
deal-making";35 as such it was also a 
perfect illustration of power politics at 
work within the UN. 
If the "indispensability" of UN is 
recognised by the privileged members of 
the club, the war with Iraq has also 
increased that sense to its wider 
membership. This is particularly evident in 
respect of the Non-Aligned Group (NAM); 
a far from cohesive group, often derided 
and frequently ignored but which 
nevertheless comprises some 117 states. 
The simple reason for this is that the US-
led war has come to be regarded - rightly 
or wrongly and international lawyers will 
continue to argue over this- as "an 
unwarranted, illegal, and unjustified 
assault on the sovereignty of an 
independent nation" .36 To the majority of 
the UN's member states, the perception of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom as a test case of 
the "Bush doctrine" on pre-emption- a 
perception greatly aided by the confusion 
over war aims and the shifting rationales 
for war emanating from Washington - has 
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only reinforced the importance of the UN's 
custodial role as protector of key Charter 
principles. 
The US and the UN afier Iraq 
The scars left by the experience of going 
down the UN route, the strength of 
unilateralist impulses and neo-con views on 
the "inherent dangers of multilateralism", 
and, not least, the sheer and overwhelming 
power of the US; all these raise questions 
about the future of US-UN relations, 
especially under the current administration. 
Against these factors, however, important 
countervailing trends point to US re-
engagement with the UN. Three 
considerations stand out and merit special 
attention. The first of these relates to 
domestic pressures and influences within 
the US. The second concerns the continuing 
need for the US to secure international 
legitimacy for its actions, not just in the 
difficult task of rebuilding Iraq, but also, 
crucially, in the "war on terror", which, 
after all, the administration has identified 
as its overriding priority and policy 
preoccupation. While there is evidence 
suggesting that members of the 
administration are already appreciating the 
potential value of the UN's legitimising 
role, the third reason why the US may turn 
to the UN is more uncertain and likely to 
remain contested. This is because it would 
involve recognising that the UN as an 
actor, for all its faults and well-documented 
weakness, has also developed areas of 
competence and expertise whose utilisation 
would serve US interests, and indeed those 
of the wider international community, in 
post-war Iraq and elsewhere. 
US Domestic Politics and the UN. Two 
points are worth making about US 
domestic politics and attitudes towards the 
UN. First, although polls should always be 
treated with caution, US public opinion 
surveys consistently show large majorities 
in favour of US engagement with 
multilateral institutions in general and the 
UN in particular. Moreover, multilateral 
endorsement for US policies and initiatives 
are considered particularly important if the 
risks and potential costs of action are 
deemed to be high. This was clearly the 
case in the run-up to the war with Iraq and 
as a general sentiment it appears to have 
survived, perhaps surprisingly, both the 
breakdown of relations among Council 
members and the outbreak of warY A 
nationwide poll conducted after the start of 
hostilities found a "very strong majority" 
believing that the importance of the UN 
had not been diminished as a result of its 
failure to approve action over Iraq. 38 Such 
attitudes cannot be entirely ignored by 
decision-makers. 39 Second, the strength of 
the ideologically driven current of ON-
scepticism now at the centre of the 
administration is historically unusual and is 
unlikely to remain unchallenged. As a 
tradition that sees engagement with the 
UN as necessarily at odds with US interests 
in the world, it has rarely shaped policy in 
decisive fashion for the simple reason that 
more pragmatically oriented and interest-
based considerations have tended to win 
out.40 The likelihood of this happening 
again is related to the second set of factors 
alluded to above. 
The Quest for Legitimacy and Allies in 
post-war Iraq and in the "War on Terror". 
It has already been observed that, if 
evidence was ever needed, Council politics 
in the run-up to the war with Iraq showed 
"power politics" to be alive and well, at 
the UN and in the wider international 
system of which the UN is necessarily a 
reflection. Yet, that observation also 
requires an important qualification, one 
directly relevant to the debate about the 
future of US relations with the UN. The 
failure to obtain even a "moral majority" 
for war in the Security Council in March 
2003 served to highlight not just the limits 
of US power but also a deeper problem 
related to its exercise.41 For, as Inis Claude, 
writing about the UN's role as an agency 
for collective legitimisation of state action, 
perceptively observed, "politics is not 
merely a struggle for power but also a 
contest over legitimacy, a competition in 
which the conferment of denial, the 
confirmation or revocation, of legitimacy is 
an important stake"Y This insight 
informed Colin Powell's successful effort to 
persuade the President in the summer 2002 
that bringing the issue of Iraq before the 
Council would, if properly handled, 
strengthen rather than weaken America's 
hand. By contrast, those, like Cheney, 
Rumsfeldt and neo-conservative 
commentators who saw the "UN as a 
trap", considered the very demonstration 
of US resolve more important than any 
legitimacy that might accrue from UN 
endorsement. Others, like Richard Pede, 
recognise the importance of legitimacy but, 
no doubt frustrated with the failure to 
persuade fellow Council members to follow 
the US-UK lead on Iraq, have argued that 
it need not derive from the UN. Instead, so 
the argument runs, it might be conferred by 
a "willing coalition of liberal 
democracies"." Quite apart from the fact 
that the events of early 2003 suggest that 
consensus on questions relating to the use 
of force will not necessarily be any easier 
to achieve among liberal democracies, the 
UN as shown above retains distinct 
advantages in this area. 
It is now clear that the diplomatic costs 
associated with the failure to secure a 
second resolution, the reaction to US 
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military actions in many parts of the world, 
as well as the growing realisation that 
securing the peace was always going to be 
more difficult than winning the war, have 
all increased the UN's potential value to 
the US. Not surprisingly, recognition of this 
fact within the administration, however 
hesitant and hedged with qualifications, 
has been voiced by Colin Powell who 
appears to have accepted the view that a 
"UN role might help lend legitimacy to a 
post-war Iraq occupation and reduce 
hostility toward it in the region and around 
the world" .44 The precise nature of UN 
involvement in Iraq is a continuing subject 
of debate within the administration, one 
that reflects the aforementioned tensions 
between a pragmatic, interest-based 
approach to UN involvement and the more 
ideologically driven wing of the 
administration. Partly because the debate is 
ideologically driven, it is unlikely to be 
resolved in the abstract. 
Far more likely to shift the debate internally 
and to influence attitudes to the UN will be 
events on the ground in Iraq, and the need for 
the US to avoid isolation, deflect anger and 
secure cooperation (active and passive) in its 
"war on terror". With respect to Iraq, 
evidence of the naivety of the "kick-in-the-
door-and-democracy-will-flourish" school to 
post-war planning has been mounting for 
some time, and not the least of the problems 
facing the US is that of limited legitimacy in 
the eyes of the local population and 
neighbouring states." A multinational 
stabilisation force may address this to some 
extent, but it is not a simple alternative to UN 
authority. As for the "war on terror", Steven 
Miller perceptively warned before the war 
that a US-led attack in Iraq might harm: 
... America's international standing, damage or 
complicate relations with overseas friends and 
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allies, and- most importantly- undercut or inhibit 
the international cooperation thought crucial to 
the effective prosecution of the war on terror.~~ 
None of this suggests an immediate 
improvement in US-UN relations, though it 
surely strengthens the hand of those within 
the administration more pragmatically 
disposed towards the organisation. If a 
rapprochement does take place, the degree 
to which the US makes use of the UN will, 
naturally, depend on the organisation's ability 
to deliver. 
The UN as an Actor. When discussing the 
UN's role as a source of legitimacy, one is 
talking about the UN as a near-universal 
collectivity of legally equal member states 
bound together, in theory at any rate, by a 
set of common principles, norms and rules 
of conduct. But the UN is also a corporate 
body and a service agency for its members, 
consisting of a Secretariat in New York 
with regional offices around the world, a 
series of specialised agencies and an 
international staff headed by a Secretary-
General.47 To convey more accurately 
these different meanings of "the UN", a 
distinction is sometimes drawn between the 
UN as an "actor" and as an "arena". 
Whilst useful, it is also a distinction, which, 
if overdone, can easily conceal the degree 
of mutual interaction and dependence 
between member states on the one hand, 
and the international bureaucracy set up to 
support them on the other. This fact has 
always complicated debates about the 
UN's performance in the field of peace and 
security, especially in the US where 
discussion about the functioning of the UN 
has for reasons alluded to above, often 
' tended to become highly polarised. Indeed, 
in Conor Cruise O'Brien's memorable 
description, it is a discussion distinguished 
by being "almost all on ... a quasi-
supernatural plane, whether in terms of a 
'strengthened' Platonic UN, or in terms of a 
UN of evil enchantment" .48 Inevitably, such 
a charged context makes difficult any 
attempt to assess "objectively" the record 
and possible utility of the UN as an actor. 
For those disposed to reject the services it 
might offer, the organisation's inability to 
learn from past mistakes, its history of 
stalled reforms, its inability to coordinate 
its specialised agencies, and, not least, its 
association with large-scale failure and 
tragedy in the 1990s are symptomatic of a 
deeper malaise. Countering this, those 
inclined to support of the organisation will 
point to its limited resources, the many 
constraints under which it operates and, 
above all, the fickleness of political support 
from member states. Clearly, there are 
elements of truth on both sides of this 
argument. But this only reinforces the point 
that what is urgently needed is for the Bush 
administration to engage in a more 
systematic, open-minded and pragmatic 
effort to identify those areas where the UN 
as an actor can make a contribution, in this 
particular case, to the US's declared 
objective of "rebuilding Iraq and returning 
it to its people" .49 
In doing so, the basic starting point is to 
recognise - and on this there is of course 
no controversy - that the UN is both 
structurally ill equipped and unlikely ever 
to obtain the requisite political support to 
undertake -that is, to plan, mount, direct 
and sustain - enforcement operations. This 
is perhaps the chief lesson from the UN's 
field operations in the 1990s. It does not 
follow from this, however, that the 
organisation is without a security role, nor 
that it is inherently incapable of adapting 
functionally to changing circumstances and 
new challenges. In the particular context of 
post-war Iraq and the multiple challenges 
now facing the US and agencies on the 
ground, the UN can, if properly resourced 
and supported, undoubtedly make a vital 
contribution. In politically uncontroversial 
areas (relatively speaking), that 
contribution has already been welcomed. 
Specifically, the UN's specialised agencies -
including the World Food Programme, 
UNICEF, the UNHCR and the UNDP- are 
repositories of technical expertise on which 
it would be foolhardy not to draw. 
Through its field operations, the UN has 
also acquired experience and specialised 
competence in more complex and 
politically sensitive areas. In particular, 
over the past decade or so, the UN has 
become deeply involved in the international 
administration of war-torn societies, often 
assuming control, on a temporary basis, of 
a wide range of critical governance 
functions (pertaining, inter alia, to law and 
order, economic reconstruction and human 
rights). The precise nature of its 
involvement, ranging from Cambodia to 
East Timor and Kosovo, has varied greatly, 
and the record of achievement is uneven. 
Nevertheless, the UN has without question 
acquired technical expertise and a keen 
sense of the political nature of the 
challenges involved. Three additional areas 
of growing UN involvement ought also to 
be of special interest: 
• The demobilisation, disarmament 
and reintegration of both regular 
and irregular forces in the 
aftermath of conflict; 
• The carrying out of complex 
monitoring tasks, including in the 
areas of human rights and WMD; 
• Local mediation in internal 
conflicts, usually involving several 
parties and reflecting complex 
patterns of communal, ethnic and 
religious tensions. 
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The record of achievement and the quality 
of the UN's performance in each of these 
areas is uneven - at times, both ineffective 
and eminently dispensable. But then so is 
the record of governments acting on their 
own, as well as that of other potential 
service providers such as regional 
organisations and private companies (in 
the latter case one need only recall the 
distinctly ambiguous record of such outfits 
as the MPRI and Executive Outcomes). 
There is yet another way in which the 
UN's resources and accumulated expertise 
can be mobilised and it is one that has been 
brought into sharp relief by the initial 
experience of US military-cum-civilian 
administrators in post-war Iraq. In the 
course of its extensive involvement in 
internal conflict, the UN has produced 
individual heads of mission and mediators 
whose richness of experience, 
demonstrated competence and political 
savvy one is bound too feel has been 
lacking on the ground in Iraq. One such 
individual was Sergio Vieiro de Mello 
whose tragic death in the attack on the UN 
compound in Baghdad on 19 August 
robbed the UN of one its most experienced 
and competent senior officials. Others 
include Alvaro de Soto, who brought the 
parties in the Cyprus dispute closer to 
settlement than at any time in the island's 
troubled history and who also played a key 
role in the Central American peace process 
in the early 1990s, and Lakhdar Brahimi, a 
former Algerian diplomat with a 
distinguished record of experience from 
Haiti and Afghanistan. It is only to be 
expected that their performance in each of 
these theatres should have been closely 
scrutinised and at times criticised, but there 
can be no doubt that they offer a pool of 
unique and impressive expertise. 
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Conclusion 
The study has argued that while the 
context in which the Iraq crisis has and is 
still being played out differs from the 1990s 
when the Security Council was also 
repeatedly faced with supposedly "defining 
moments", the organisation is not facing 
the ultimate test of its "relevance" or 
"credibility". The changing context is a 
function, above all, of the prism through 
which the United States views threats to its 
own and international security after 11 
September 2001. Neither those threats, 
which are real and need to be taken 
seriously, nor the stormy politics of Iraq at 
the Security Council in 2002 and 2003, 
should lead to the conclusion that the UN is 
destined to become little more than a 
"glorified humanitarian agency". That 
view, though widespread among journalists 
and public opinion at present, rests upon a 
basic misunderstanding of the UN's role in 
international peace and security. As the 
realities of rebuilding Iraq become ever 
more apparent, as the long-term costs of 
the diplomatic debacle in New York in 
early 2003 filter through, and as the 
challenges posed by terrorism and the 
proliferation of WMD remain, interest-
based calculations and principle both point 
to a return to UN, one based, hopefully, on 
a better recognition of the UN's strengths 
as well as its weaknesses. 
Postscript: October 2003 
Six months after the formal end of major 
combat operations, Iraq is firmly back on 
the Security Council agenda. Far from 
being relegated to the sidelines, the Council 
is providing a viral forum for the 
"international community" to work out 
how to ensure that stability is brought to 
post-war Iraq. To this end, President Bush, 
on 23 September 2003, urged fellow 
member states to give the UN a higher 
profile in post-war Iraq, even though he 
stopped well short of offering to cede 
command and control of military 
operations.50 The US administration is 
clearly hoping that by giving the UN a 
more central role - say, by assisting in 
developing a constitution and organising 
elections- it will become possible for more 
non-US troops to be deployed on the 
ground and for the financial burdens of 
reconstruction to be shared more evenly. 
Above all, the administration is hoping that 
UN involvement will confer greater 
legitimacy on its activities in Iraq. Without 
legitimacy, the perception that the US-led 
coalition is no more than an alien 
occupying force - as opposed to an 
instrument to facilitate and ease the 
transition to genuine self-rule - is likely to 
intensify further among Iraqis. In a 
paradoxical twist, the UN Secretariat, 
following the devastating and 
unprecedented attack on its compound in 
Baghdad on 19 August, is now showing 
(albeit in private) greater reservations 
about deepening its involvement than some 
US officials. 
Iraq is, however, far from being the only 
item on the Council's agenda, and it is by 
looking at its decisions elsewhere since 
May 2003 that one can more fully 
appreciate the reality of its continuing role 
in the field of peace and security. 
On 19 September, a few days before 
President Bush's appearance before the 
General Assembly, the Security Council 
unanimously passed Resolution 1509 on 
Liberia. It almost escaped media attention. 
And yet, the resolution established a 
15,000-strong UN force for Liberia 
(UNMIL) under Chapter VII of the Charter 
for an initial period of 12 months." 
UNMIL's mission is to bring peace and 
stability to a country ravaged by civil war 
and is far from being a simple or 
"traditional" peacekeeping operation, 
involving as it does the deployment of 
civilian police officers and the 
disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration of combatants. The creation 
of UNMIL comes in addition to two other 
missions authorised by the Council. On 13 
May 2003 -a little less than two weeks 
after the formal end of hostilities in Iraq -
the Council authorised the establishment of 
the UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire 
(MINUCI). A few weeks later, on 30 May, 
it authorised the deployment of a French-
led Interim Emergency Multinational Force 
to Eastern parts of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. In both these cases, the 
US and the French had no difficulties 
reaching agreement. In addition to all of 
this, the UN Secretariat is also planning 
and preparing for a large-scale mission to 
Sudan. Once the UN force to Liberia is 
fully deployed, the total number of troops 
and civilians deployed on operations will 
be close to 50,000, which by historical 
standards is very a high figure. The UN 
Secretariat has rarely been so busy. 
None of this, of course, is to suggest that 
there are no limits to what the organisation 
can take on. Indeed, in none of the 
operations listed above is the UN charged 
with a combat or strict enforcement role. 
Nevertheless, the level and the types of 
activity displayed show that the UN has 
gradually taken on a wider range of tasks. 
Events in Iraq are likely to reenforce the 
value of developing the UN"s ability to 
perform these tasks more effectively. 
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